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Abstract
Different models of capital exchange among economic agents have been proposed
recently trying to explain the emergence of Pareto’s wealth power law distribution.
One important factor to be considered is the existence of risk aversion. In this paper
we study a model where agents posses different levels of risk aversion, going from
uniform to a random distribution. In all cases the risk aversion level for a given agent
is constant during the simulation. While for a uniform and constant risk aversion
the system self-organizes in a distribution that goes from an unfair “one takes all”
distribution to a Gaussian one, a random risk aversion can produce distributions go-
ing from exponential to log-normal and power-law. Besides, interesting correlations
between wealth and risk aversion are found.
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Probably one of the most important contribution to the study of the distri-
bution of personal income and wealth was made at the end of the XIXth
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Fig. 1. GNI ranking of 179 countries(7)
century by Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto. In his book “Cours d’Economie
Politique”(1), he presented the statistical analysis of the income distribution of
different European regions and countries. He concluded that the income distri-
bution follows a rather universal law, characterized by a logarithmic pattern,
described by the formula: logN ∝ αlog(w); where N is the number of income
earners with income higher than w and the exponent α is named Pareto index.
This income distribution is a power law and Pareto determined the exponent
to be 1.2 ≤ α ≤ 1.9. Pareto’s law is a classical example of a distribution with
no characteristic scale and, as asserted by Pareto himself, a low value of the
slope α denotes a higher inequality of the income distribution.
However, analysis of current economic data seems to indicate that Pareto’s law
is valid for the high income strata of society, while for middle and low income
classes the distribution appears to be a log-normal (Gibrat) distribution. Data
for Japan(2; 3; 4), the United Kingdom and the United States of America(5; 6)
confirm this idea. Also, in Fig. 1 we present a plot in log-log scale of GNI
(Gross National Income) data of 179 countries (7) where it is possible to make
a power law fit for the richer countries, while the others seems to be better
fitted by an exponential or log-normal distribution.
A great deal of effort has been devoted to obtain the power law distribu-
tion of the wealthiest strata(8; 9; 10; 11; 12; 13). In previous articles we have
proposed a Conservative Exchange Market Model (CEMM)(14; 15) with ex-
tremal dynamics of the kind of Self-Organized Criticality (SOC) theories(16;
17). The obtained distribution was a Gibbs-exponential type and the results
were in good agreement with the distribution of some welfare states such as
Sweden(18). Other authors(9; 10) have proposed models in which agents save
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a fraction of their capital, and only the rest may be exchanged. In the language
of economics this saved part of the resources is a measure of the agent risk
aversion. Following these ideas, we present here a family of models that com-
bine the risk aversion ingredients with Monte Carlo dynamics and extremal
dynamics. We found different interesting shapes for the wealth distribution,
and in some particular cases a power law profile is obtained.
Let us consider a set of economic agents characterized by a risk aversion factor
β(i), so that [1 − β(i)] is the percentage of wealth the i−agent is willing to
risk. An agent with β(i) = 0 is a radical one who risks all his assets, while,
on the other hand, β(i) = 1 characterizes a totally conservative agent who
simply does not play the game. The dynamics of the system is as follows: For
the choice of the two partners, one can adopt an extremal dynamics as in
previous calculations(14; 15), or a Monte Carlo method as in refs. (9; 10; 11).
In the first case we start by determining the site with the minimum wealth,
and then we choose the other partner of the exchange at random. In the
second case both agents are chosen at random, independently of their wealth.
When considering the case of extremal -minimum - dynamics we model the
situation where the poorest agent will try to do something to improve its
situation, or else, some external regulator (government, for example) will act
in order to favor the handicapped. In that case one expects a more equitable
wealth distribution. The second case is best adapted to represent a kind of
stock market, where the transactions occur independently of the fortune of
the agents, and in general the poverty line is strictly zero, that is agents can
bankrupt. In both cases, we prescribe that no agent can win more than he
puts at stake, so the value that will be exchange is the minimum value of the
available resources of each agent, i.e. dw = min[(1 − β1)w1; (1− β2)w2].
Finally, we introduce a probability p ≥ 0.5 of favoring the poorer of the two
partners, because a stable society requires that the poor have an advantage
in transactions with the wealthy and are protected by particular rights and
marketing freedom(10). Increasing the probability of favoring the poorer agent
is a way to simulate the action of the state or of some type of regulatory policy
that tries to redistribute the resources(15; 18). We consider two cases: a) a
fixed probability p going from 0.5 to 1 and b) a random value of p, making
use of the expression proposed in ref (10),
p = 1/2 + f ×
w1 − w2
w1 + w2
(1)
w1 being the wealth of the richer partner and w2 that of the poorer one; f is
a factor going from 0 (equal probability for each agent) to 1/2.
We consider the number of agents N ranging from 104 to 106 and a number
of average exchanges going from 103 to 104 per agent. In addition to the two
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different types of dynamics for the system we present here results for a) β
and p uniform b) β and p random. The discussion of the first case, although
rather idealized, is important in order to have a clear idea of the effect of risk
aversion and of the probability of having or not a better treatment for the
disfavored layers of the population. The second case is a more realistic vision
of an heterogeneous society. Of course, in the real world, agents can change
their risk strategy as a function of the results. This possibility will be discussed
in a forthcoming article.
a) Uniform β and p
In this rather hypothetical situation all agents have the same risk aversion
parameter β, and all transactions have the same probability p of favoring the
poorer agent. Both parameters are constant during the simulation. Lets first
present the results for the Monte Carlo simulation, where both agents are cho-
sen at random. The results are summarized in the diagram depicted in Fig. 2
The different regions correspond to different types of resulting wealth distri-
butions. Wealth distributions in Region I are very narrow and Gaussian-like,
so we call this region Utopian socialism because almost all agents have the
same income with a small dispersion. Region II has Gaussian-like distribu-
tions too but skewed to higher values of wealth, therefore we named it liberal
socialism. Next region (III) has hybrid wealth distribution, Gaussian-like for
low wealth values, and exponential for high wealth values, and we call it mod-
erated capitalism. In the last region (IV) wealth distribution are exponentials
with a tendency to power-laws, so we call this region of ruthless capitalism.
The different type of wealth distribution in the four regions can be seen in
Fig. 2 for some typical values of the parameters β and p. Outside Region IV
there is a region of parameters that we called the few rich land as the outcome
of the dynamics ultimately favors just one (or a very few) agent which concen-
trates all the available resources. In this later case, since no more exchanges
are possible, the system freezes: a very greed economy carries in itself its own
destruction. Obviously the β = 1 line is of no interest, and the same is true
for the p ≤ 0.5 region which is always in the few rich land.
Simple as it is, this model captures the essence of general economic exchanges,
considering the resulting wealth distribution corresponding to different eco-
nomic policies old and present. It is amusing that just playing with the two nu-
merical parameters of the model very different behaviors are obtained. Utopian
socialism, for example, exhibits slight economical differences between agents
and this is due to the combined force of high values of β and p, which means a
repressed market and a strong intervention favoring the poorer. The gradual
liberalization of the market, through lower risk aversion (less controlled mar-
ket) and less state intervention in the social sense (lower values of p), gives
rise to more liberal economies with higher inequalities in the income.
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Fig. 2. Model with uniform β and p, for N = 105 and 103 transaction per agent.
Region I correspond to a very narrow wealth distribution, utopian socialism, region
II and III present skewed Gaussians and region IV corresponds to an exponential
distribution. Outside these regions there is no a true wealth distribution because in
the few rich land one or few agents concentrate all the available resources while the
others have strictly zero wealth
We have also performed simulations for this case, but using extremal dynamics
of the type described in refs.(14; 15). That means that one of the partners is
the agent with the minimum wealth, while the second one is chosen at random.
The results are rather odd. For low values of p, the dynamics of the system
freezes with no subsequent economic activity, because the agent with minimum
wealth has no resources to exchange, so the system converges to zero activity.
One possible way to overcome this situation should be to consider a different
asset transfer rule. On the other hand, for 0.7 ≤ p ≤ 1. the minimum dynamics
generates an exponential distribution, where almost all the agents lie in the
middle class. However, for some values of β ≥ 0.7 and p ≈ 1 the middle class is
split in two income regions with a gap in between. This is probably so because
of some kind of anti-resonance combined effect of the rules of the dynamics
and the conservation constraint.
b) Random β and p
In a more realistic approach to the risk preferences in the population, we
consider a disordered risk aversion parameter throughout the system. Each
agent is assigned a value of βi, drawn at random from a uniform distribution
on the interval (0, 1). We consider only quenched disorder, where each agent
maintains his risk aversion despite the outcome of the exchange, disregarding
his own success or failure in increasing her wealth. Simulations have been
carried out for different values of the probability p and also for the complete
range of the asymmetry parameter f in Eq.1.
Some typical distribution curves are shown in the left panel of Fig. 3. For
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Fig. 3. Left panel: Wealth distribution for random β and Monte Carlo dynamics,
the distribution is calculated for N = 105 and 104 exchanges per agent on average.
Results are shown for three values of the asymmetry parameter, as shown in the
legend. A x−2 curve is also shown to guide the eye. Right panel: Correlation between
wealth and saving parameter for N = 105, f = 0.5
f = 0, i. e. when trades do not favor either of the partners, the distribution
of wealth becomes, slowly but steadily, a delta function at w = 0, with the
wealth concentrated in one or a few agents, and the rest owning effectively
nothing (this results are not shown in Fig. 3). This can happen, even though
each agent risks only part of his capital at each interaction, because there
is no restriction in the amount he can loose in successive exchanges. The
situation is a multiplicative process with w = 0 as an absorbing point. On
the contrary, when the externally imposed asymmetry favors, statistically, the
poorer agent, we observe the emergence of a distribution characterized by three
regimes. There is a peak in the distribution that separates a poor class to the
left, from a middle class to the right (see for example the full line in Fig. 3,
corresponding to f = 0.5). The middle class follows a power law distribution
of the form P (w) ∼ w−α, with α depending on the value of f , and α ≈ 2
for f = 0.5. Finally, there is a transition from this power law behavior to an
exponential tail encompassing the wealthier agents. This exponential tail is
not an effect of the finite size of the system, as has been verified for system
sizes up to 106. Also one can observe that there is a finite number of very poor
people, contrasting with previous case (a). We have also represented on the
right panel of Fig. 3 the correlation between wealth and risk aversion. One
observes that the range of wealth variation is up to five magnitude orders.
Besides that, on average, the higher values of income correspond to a high
risk aversion, while the highest individual wealths correspond to risk-loving
agents. But also the lowest incomes belong to risky agents, as expected.
When considering extremal (minimum) dynamics, the results are quite differ-
ent as they are shown on Fig.4. It is possible to see that it appears a threshold,
or poverty line, and also that the distribution is very narrow compared to the
Monte Carlo case. One observes that there are vary many few people below
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the poverty line and its value is around 0.38 for f = 0.5 Moreover, the high
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Fig. 4. Left panel: Wealth distribution for random β and minimum dynamics for
N = 105 and 104 exchanges per agent, in average, and for f = 0.5. The high income
region is well fitted by a kind of exponential distribution with a ≈ 1.1 and wo ≈ 0.7.
Right panel: Correlation between wealth and saving parameter for the same values
of N and f .
income region behaves in an exponential way, following a law of the type
P (w) ≈ exp{−a(w − wo)
2} with a ≈ 1.1 and wo ≈ 0.7 for f = 0.5. The
poverty line is well seen too on the right panel of Fig.4, all the agents are
above 0.38 and now it is clear that a low risk aversion favors, on average, a
higher wealth.
To conclude: taking into account risk aversion (or saving, as defined by others
authors(9; 10)) generates a rich variety of wealth distributions, when com-
bined with different choices of trading rules. For some particular values of
the exchange probability p and a random choice of β a power law profile
is obtained. Here we have compared in detail an extremal and Monte Carlo
dynamics for constant and random risk aversion and a simple exchange bias.
Extremal (minimum) dynamics provides a more equitable society, in the sense
proposed in the classical work by J. Rawls(19): no redistribution of resources
within... a state can occur unless it benefits the least well-off, and this is clear
because of the existence of a poverty line and the emergence of a wealth dis-
tribution with a large middle class. Monte Carlo dynamics seems to better
reproduce a capitalist society: there are very many people with almost zero
income and one can observe a power law distribution for the higher layers of
the social spectra. Of course people can change its risk strategy as a function
of their own results. We have investigated this possibility and the results will
be published elsewhere.
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